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COMMENTS
ARE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS IMPARTIAL
TRIBUNALS?
Does due process of law as to legal procedure require that a
judge be not personally interested in any case before him?
Due process of law as to legal procedure does not always require a judicial tribunal,' but it does require an impartial
tribunal. 2 It is a maxim of the common law that no one ought
to be a judge in his own cause, and from the time of Lord Cokes
to date4 it has been held that when a judge's own rights are in
question he has no power to determine the cause, whether or
not he is a party to the record. An exception to this rule has
been made where the interest is so remote, trifling and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed to be incapable of influencing the conduct of an individual, as where the judge's interest is merely that of a taxpayer in a tax case or a member of
a state bar association in a disbarment proceeding, but otherwise the principle has been adhered to whenever tested in court.5
Yet in spite of this principle of the common law it has been
the practice in Indiana and other states of the United States to
allow justices of the peace, mayors, and other lesser officials to
hold court when their compensation was made to depend in part
or wholly upon convictions, and they thus apparently had a personal pecuniary interest in the case. 6 It is difficult to understand how it could have been thought that such a judge had the
legal power to try such a case; but evidently it has been so
thought, for justices of the peace, etc., have been trying cases
and convicting people throughout United States' history.
Are such tribunals impartial tribunals under the due process
clause of the Fourtenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ?
In the recent case of Tumey v. State of Ohiol the United
1 Fallbrook IrrigationDistrict v. Bradley (1896), 164 U. S. 112; United
States v. Ju Toy (1905), 198 U. S. 253.
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (Eighth Ed.), 870-873; Moore V.
Dempsey (1923), 261 U. S. 86.
8 Bonham's Case (1610), 2 Brownl. 255.
4 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (Eighth Ed.), 870.
5 Ibid, 872-873.
GBurns Annotated Indiana Statutes (1926), Sec. 2322; Watson's McDonald's Treatise, p. 252.
7 (1926) 47 Sup. Ct. 437.
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States Supreme Court has at last given us an answer to this
question. In this case one Tumey was arrested and brought
before the mayor of a village in Ohio, charged with unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor. Under the laws of Ohio the
mayor, as well as justices of the peace, and certain other judges,
had jurisdiction to try the case and he was entitled to retain
the amount of his costs in each case in addition to his regular
salary, but no costs were to be paid him except by the defendant
in case of conviction. The mayor denied defendants motion to
dismiss the case because of the mayor's disqualification, convicted him of the offense charged and fined him one hundred
dollars and costs (in this case twelve dollars for the mayor)
and ordered him to be imprisoned until the fine and costs were
paid. The common pleas reversed this judgment, the Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment of the common pleas and the
Supreme Court dismissed a petition of right asking that the
judgment of the mayor's court be reversed on Constitutional
grounds. The case was then taken to the United States Supreme
Court on a writ of error, and the United States Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case on the ground that the defendant had been denied due process of law because not tried before
an impartial tribunal.
Chief Justice Taft, writing the opinion first announced the
general rule of disqualification of judicial or quasi judicial officers whenever they have an interest in the controversy to be
decided; then admitted that there were certain exceptions to the
rule in cases of minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest,
as where the judge is a member of a class of taxpayers, where
there is no other judge not equally disqualified and where legislative discretion is allowed in certain matters of remoteness of
interest in kinship, personal bias, or state policy; and then
added, "But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment
and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of
law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court,
the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case." Chief
Justice Taft admitted that in determining what is due process
of law consideration must be given "to those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law
of England before the emigration of our ancestors" and to state
precedents in the United States, but after a careful investigation of English and United States history he finally decided that
"From this review we conclude that a system by which an in-
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ferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the
defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general
practice, either at common law or in this country, that it can
be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within
the maxim "de minimis non curat lex."
The decision involved only a mayor but it would seem that the
doctrine of the case should apply to justices of the peace and
all other judges who are circumstanced as was the mayor in
8
the Ohio case, and a court in Ohio has so held.
The decision in the instant case ought to be regarded as sound
and the Supreme Court should be commended for it. The remarkable thing about it is not that it has at last been rendered
but that it was not rendered before. It would seem to spell the
doom of the courts of justices of the peace, at least so far as
they are not on a salary basis, for Tumey has pointed the way
for all criminal defendants ;9 but if any part of our judicial system needs reforming it is that part concerning justices of the
peace. The goal of justices of the peace in the United States
seems to have been to develop as poor a court as possible. They
have attained their goal. Their work has been accomplished.
It is hard to see how any court could be any worse. They
ought now to be relieved from further labor. They should have
been reformed or abolished long ago by political action; and
8

Foster v. State of Ohio (1927), 26 N. P. (N. S.) 476; In re Canfield
and Duckett (1927), 26 N. P. (N. S.) 465.
9 In the case of Tari v. State of Ohio, 17 Oh. St. 274, the Supreme Court
of Ohio, while assuming that the decision in the Tumey case applies to
justices of the peace, took the position that it did not declare unconstitutional the statutes of Ohio so far as they established a tribunal that was
not impartial and that the judgments of such courts were not void, but
only voidable, and that the effect of the decision was to give to defendants
the privilege of objecting to the disqualification of the judge and that if
this is not done the disqualification is waived and the defendant has had
due process of law as to procedure in spite of the fact that the tribunal
is not impartial. The case of Ex parte Baer (1927), 20 Fed. (2nd) 912, took
the opposite position. Probably, because of the procedural rules that no
one not injured can raise a constitutional point and that the Supreme Court
will not consider questions not raised in the state courts the result reached
by the Ohio court cannot be escaped; but it is difficult to follow the court
when it makes the startling statement that the Tumey case did not decide
the question of the constitutionality of the Ohio Statutes. Of course the
Supreme Court never repeals a statute,---not even when it expressly declares it unconstitutional.
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it is an encouraging sign that though politicians may neglect
their duties the judiciary does not.10
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS.
Indiana University School of Law.
10 The Indiana Constitution (Art. 7, Sec. 14) provides for the election
for four years of "a competent number of Justices of the Peace" "by the
voters in each township," and that "their powers and duties shall be prescribed by law." The Indiana statutes (Secs. 2019-2022, 2322 Burns Anno.
Stat. 1926) provide for the compensation of justices of the peace through
a system of fees, as in Ohio, in all townships in which there is no city of
at least forty-five thousand population, where they are placed upon a
salary basis (but there is a question as to the constitutionality of that part
of the law which relates to townships having such cities, under Art. 4,
Sec. 22 of the Indiana Constitution.) Hence whatever has been said in this
comment about the Tumey case, supra, applies to justices of the peace in
Indiana (with the possible exception of those in townships having a city
with a population of at least forty-five thousand). In Indiana, where the
duties of city judge have been devolved upon the mayor, the latter is
entitled by law to a salary of six hundred dollars (Sec. 10264 Burns' Anno.
Stat. 1926)

